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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES



To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

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Record Group 120: Records of the American Expeditionary Forces

1. Report of June 9, 1919, from Captain Montgomery Schuyler to the Chief of Staff, A.E.F., Siberia (pp. 1 and 2 only).
2. Report of March 1, 1919, from Captain Montgomery Schuyler to Lt. Colonel Barrows, Vladivostok.

In testimony whereof, I, WAYNE C. GROVER, Archivist of the United States, have hereunto caused the Seal of the National Archives to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Chief Archivist War Records Division of the National Archives, in the District of Columbia, this 2nd day of September 1960.

Wayne C. Grover
Archivist of the United States

By Dallas Irvine

Memo

The attached pages are photostatic reproductions officially certified by the proper officials in charge of the National Archives of the U. S. Government in Washington, D. C.

As is obvious, this report involves confidential information sent by Captain Montgomery Schuyler to the Chief of Staff at a time when the Bolshevik dictatorship was about to be consummated in the Soviet Union.

Page 2 ends with an incomplete sentence merely because other lengthy reports associated with the pages which were reproduced did not seem apropos to the subject in hand.

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HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, SIBERIA

Vladivostok, Siberia,
June 9th, 1919.

From: Captain Montgomery Schuyler.

To: The Chief of Staff

Subject: General Report - Omsk.

1. In compliance with orders of the Commanding General (Secret) October 25th, 1918, I left Vladivostok on November 20th, 1918 and proceeded to Omsk which I reached on December 8th, 1918. I left that city, also in compliance with orders, April 26th, 1919 and arrived in Vladivostok on May 7th, 1919.

2-5. Full and accurate information as to the "local personalities" at Omsk is rather difficult as both military and civil officials of the government there are constantly changing and since my departure there have been many new appointments in both the Cabinet and War Ministry.

The Government as at present administered consists of first, Admiral Kolchak, with the title of "Supreme Ruler". On the civil side the Government consists of a Council of Ministers presided over by the President of a Council of Ministers. This Council at the present time is forced to do both legislative and executive function. On the military side the Admiral has the so-called "Stavka" or General Staff and the Ministry of War which is one of the divisions of the civil cabinet. Up to the time of my departure the General Staff and the War Ministry had separate heads and their respective functions were constantly causing friction owing to the lack of clearly defined spheres of activity. Since then, however, they have been united under one man who is the Chief of both divisions and this change it is believed will bring about greater unity and coordination in the military work. The General Staff is in charge of all matters pertaining to the front and to the active campaign against the Bolsheviks. The Ministry of War is charged with the duties of mobilization, transport and supplies as well as of all military operations in the rear, which term is now used to include all territory East of Omsk. With the great gains of territory which have been made by the army this Spring, it has been found necessary to have the General Staff nearer the actual theatre of operations and preparations are now being made to move it from Omsk to Ekaterinburg. Admiral Kolchak has stated that he will not move the civil government from Omsk until he is able to take it direct to Moscow or Petrograd.

Both the civil and military departments at Omsk, at the present time, suffer from the lack of men trained in leadership, and of executive ability. When Admiral Kolchak came in power he found no men in the government who were capable of filling the offices they held, with the possible exception of Mr. Vologodsky, the President of the Council of Ministers. Nearly all of the other ministers were of the long-haired, loud-mouthed type and spent so much time in fruitless discussion that they were never able to get any action even on the most urgent matters. These men are gradually being replaced as new men can be found of greater executive ability and there is a steady but slow improvement in the calibre of the ministers. It must be remembered, however, that owing to the geographical limitations, Admiral Kolchak had only Siberia to draw from and Siberia has never been known as a breeding place for Russian statesmen, on the contrary it has always been the dumping ground of persons whose presence in European Russia was not desired by the Government. Practically none of the trained officers of the old army are now available, those of them that survived the war with Germany having nearly all been murdered by the Bolsheviks as they were found in European Russia. In the Black Sea massacre it is stated that not less than 8,000 officers were murdered and at Kronstadt, in the Gulf of Finland, between six and seven thousand were drowned at one time. The present officers of the Siberian Army are either former non-commissioned officers of the old army or young boys who have had just sufficient education to be able to do the necessary paper work and neither kind are of the right stamp to reorganize a new army and to hammer out a fighting force from the hopeless anarchy into which Kerensky and his successors, Lenine and Trotsky, have thrown the Russian people.

At the time when Admiral Kolchak took over the Government in November 1918 as the result of a coup d'etat which was engineered by the Cabinet during the Admiral's absence at the front in an effort of the more sensible members to get rid of the paralyzing influence of Avksentiev and his followers. Almost immediately after this Admiral Kolchak had pneumonia and it was not until January 1919 that a real beginning was made in the reorganization of Russia. Up to the end of 1918 things had been growing steadily worse in Russia ever since the first few months of the First Provisional Government, when for a short time it looked as if the new regime would be ~~hopeless~~ to bring some sort of modern government into the country. These hopes were frustrated by the gradual gains in power of the more irresponsible and socialistic elements of the population guided by the Jews and other anti-Russian races. A table made in April 1918 by Robert Wilton, the correspondent of the London Times in Russia, shows that at that time there were 384 "commissars" including 2 negroes, 13 Russians, 15 Chinamen, 22 Armenians and more than 300 Jews. Of the latter number 264 had come to Russia from the United States since the downfall of the Imperial Government. It is only since the

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383.9 Mil. Int. Report.

DECLASSIFIED

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Schuyler

DOD Dir, 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1958

WAR DEPARTMENT

HWYR by Krausling Date 3-17-63

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, SIBERIA.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

INTELLIGENCE SECTION

March 1, 1919. ✓

My dear Colonel Barrows:

I have just received your letter of January 29th, forwarded by Baron Hoven of General Romanovsky's staff, who has just arrived in Omsk. I was of course much interested in your news, as I had been unable to find anything about the movements of our officers or as to myself.

I was afraid that I should be stranded in Omsk for some little time even if the others got away and although I want to get home just as soon as possible for urgent personal business reasons, I realize that I am of more use here than possibly anywhere else. This work, however, is so familiar to me as this is the fifth revolution I have watched in the pains of birth, that I must confess it has lost its charm of novelty.

I have not attempted to write you anything concerning the situation in Omsk as I have felt that conditions here were so fluid that what I wrote would be valueless when received by you. Lieutenant Cushing is preparing a sort of weekly report which he will send in in his own name and which will suffice for us both for the present. My telegrams have been perhaps more numerous than you desired and some of the subjects mentioned may not interest our expedition in the least. This I was aware of when sending them but I felt it was better to err on the side of fullness than the other way. I am strictly obeying my orders to keep out of local affairs and avoid giving advice, but I must say it is very hard not to jump in and manage this government entirely.

The problems which the Omsk Government has to face are not at all intrinsically different from those which prevail in every movement of the kind known to history, but the besetting problem in this instance is that Admiral Kolchak has to work with the materials available for his purposes, namely the Russian people of today, who are so thoroughly disorganized and lifeless as a result of the last three years, that that they are unable even to think for themselves far less to govern themselves.

In the first place, the coup of Admiral Kolchak's friends whereby he assumed the role of Supreme Governor was absolutely necessary if the whole of Siberia was not to fall ripe into the hands of the Bolsheviks. That visionary set of impractical theorists with whom I spent an evening in a railroad car at a Manchurian station- Messrs Aksentieff and company- were far worse than out and out anarchists, for they were weak dreamers who could not even maintain the ordinary police security necessary to life in any community. Crime was rife in the streets of Omsk, murders and hold ups were of nightly occurrence in this city on the main streets and the Bolshevik city governments throughout Siberia were running things their own way just as they are in Vladivostok today.

It is of course difficult to legalize Admiral Kolchak's position, in fact it is impossible, for while it was done by the decree of the so called government of the time, it was simply a coup d'etat. His status however is as good according to Russian law as that of any of the revolutionary governments which preceded him.

In the beginning and of necessity his acts for the restoration of order were autocratic; he depended on the support of the army and the officers especially, and he put down local disorder with a high hand.

X 201 Schuyler

X 201 Barrows

WAR DEPARTMENT
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, SIBERIA.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

-2-

Ever since then however, he has shown himself in so far as he could safely do so, more and more liberal, and I have no hesitation in saying that I firmly believe that his own opinions and frame of mind are far more liberal than the outside world gives him credit for. He is unfortunate in this that he has had to depend upon the mailed fist to maintain his position and to keep his government from being overriden by the Bolshevik elements which are numerous in every city in Siberia.

It is probably unwise to say this loudly in the United States but the Bolshevik movement is and has been since its beginning guided and controlled by Russian Jews of the greasiest type, who have been in the United States and there absorbed every one of the worst phases of our civilization without having the least understanding of what we really mean by liberty. I do not mean the use of the word liberty which has been so widespread in the United States since the war began, but the real word spelt the same way), and the real Russian realizes this and suspects that Americans think as do the loathsome specimens with whom he now comes in contact. I have heard all sorts of estimates as to the real proportion of Bolsheviks to that of the population of Siberia and I think the most accurate is that of General Ivanov-Rinov who estimates it as two per cent. There is hardly a peasant this side of the Urals who has the slightest interest in the Bolshevik or his doings except in so far as it concerns the loss of his own property and, in fact, his point of view is very much like that of our own respectable farmers, when confronted with the IWW ideal.

Unfortunately, a few of our people in the United States, especially those with good lungs, seem to think that the Bolsheviks are as deserving of a hearing as any real political party with us. This is what the Russian cannot understand and I must say that without being thought one sided, I should not hesitate to shoot without trial if I had the power any persons who admitted for one moment that they were Bolsheviks. I would just as soon see a mad dog running about a lot of children.

You will think I am hot about this matter but it is I feel sure, one which is going to bring great trouble on the United States when the judgment of history is all be recorded on the part we have played. It is very largely our fault that Bolshevism has spread as it has and I do not believe we will be found guiltless of the thousands of lives uselessly and cruelly sacrificed in wild orgies of bloodshed to establish and autocratic and despotic rule of principles which have been rejected by every generation of mankind which has dealt with them.

There have been times during the past month when I have been afraid that the Kolchak government would not last until the next mornig I have had I suppose, the closest connection with the leaders here of any foreigner in Omsk and my sources of information are so many and so varied that I am pretty sure to hear the different points of view on every imaginable question. The announcement of the Princes' Island conference with Bolsheviks came as a clap of thunder to the government, in fact it so took the wind out of their sails, that I believe they would have thrown up the government and run away if it had not been for

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

-3-

timely and cool headed advice which they received. When the news became more widely known there was a fairly strong reactionary movement started by Cossack officers and adherents of the old regime. This was discovered and allowed to die a natural death with very good results. With the failure of the princes Island conference, the government began to get back a little of the strength it had lost and today I believe it will hold on for some time, provided it does not get another series of hard knocks from the Allies or the United States.

The very clever and most unscrupulous Japanese propaganda which has been carried on here is one of the most interesting I have ever seen carried out by that country. The way the Japanese took over Korea and we made a scrap of paper of our solemn treaty with that poor little miserable people was child's play to the present methods of procedure in regard to Kax Siberia. Admiral Kolchak hates the Japanese the latter naturally are not unaware of that feeling and cordially reciprocate it and the combination of their propaganda with that of the Bolsheviks in the United States and elsewhere is very powerful. I can understand how people who know nothing of our foreign relations or of the Russian people can be carried off their feet by it but how responsible men can listen to it I do not know. If the feelings of the Russian people are to be consulted and the future of their own country is to be in their hands there will be no Bolshevik future for this land. They have submitted to it first, from the very good reason that they did not know how to go about fighting it and second, because it came at the psychological moment when the morale of the people had been so shaken that they were ready to endure anything in order to be allowed to be let alone.

The scheme now being worked out for a popular assembly for all parts of Siberia will, I am sure, be of service and even if only partially successful- and I do not see at present how it can be more- will do much towards proving the sincerity of Kolchak in his promises.

Please do not get the idea that I am enthusiastically in favor of the present government, that I consider it ideal or even good, for it is not; but I do consider that it has already united more varied and more numerous elements of the Russian people than any other government which might take its place would do. The question of the moment is not an ideal government but one that will last for the next few weeks and will restore order enough so that any elections may have a fair chance of being carried out without force and fraud and graft.

Personally, I am fairly comfortable here; Cushing and I have each a room requisitioned by the government and it will be impossible to carry out the recommendations made by the Adjutant in a recent telegram because there are no rooms to be had and we have had applications for two months already. With kind regards to all friends,

I am, Very sincerely yours,

Montgomery C. Hughes
Captain, U.S.A.

Lt Col. B. A. rows,
Vladivostck.

FEB. 6 1961

New Zionist Publications—No. 1

GREAT BRITAIN THE JEWS AND PALESTINE

by

SAMUEL LANDMAN



MARCH 1936

Price 6d.

NEW ZIONIST PRESS
47, Finchley Road, London, N.W. 8

The author of this pamphlet is a well-known English Zionist. He was Hon. Secretary of the Joint Zionist Council of the United Kingdom in 1912, Joint Editor of the "Zionist" in 1913-14 and Author of pamphlets on "History of Zionism" and "Zionism, Its Organisation and Institutions" published during the war. From 1917 to 1922 he was Solicitor and Secretary to the Zionist Organisation. He is now Legal Adviser to the New Zionist Organisation.

GREAT BRITAIN, THE JEWS AND PALESTINE

AS the Balfour Declaration originated in the War Cabinet, was consummated in the Foreign Office and is being implemented in the Colonial Office, and as some of those responsible for it have passed away or have retired since its migrations from Department to Department, there is necessarily some confusion or misunderstanding as to its raison d'être and importance to the parties primarily concerned. It would, therefore, seem opportune to recapitulate briefly the circumstances, the inner history and incidents that eventually led to the British Mandate for Palestine.

Those who assisted at the birth of the Balfour Declaration were few in number. This makes it important to bring into proper relief the services of one who, owing above all to his own modesty, has hitherto remained in the background. His services however should take their proper place in the front rank alongside of those Englishmen of vision whose services are more widely known, including the late Sir Mark Sykes, the Rt. Hon. W. Ormsby Gore, The Rt. Hon. Sir Ronald Graham, General Sir George Macdonagh and Mr. G. H. Fitzmaurice.

In the early years of the War great efforts were made by the Zionist Leaders, Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Sokolow, chiefly through the late Mr. C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian*, and Sir Herbert Samuel, to induce the Cabinet to espouse the cause of Zionism.

These efforts were, however, without avail. In fact, Sir Herbert Samuel has publicly stated that he had no share in the initiation of the negotiations which led to the Balfour Declaration.* The actual initiator was Mr. James A. Malcolm and the following is a brief account of the circumstances in which the negotiations took place.

* "England and Palestine," lecture delivered by Sir Herbert Samuel, published the Jewish Historical Society, London (February, 1936).

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Samuel Brit & Palestine, 25-1935-
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During the critical days of 1916 and of the impending defection of Russia, Jewry, as a whole, was against the Czarist regime and had hopes that Germany, if victorious, would in certain circumstances give them Palestine. Several attempts to bring America into the War on the side of the Allies by influencing influential Jewish opinion were made and had failed. Mr. James A. Malcolm, who was already aware of German pre-war efforts to secure a foothold in Palestine through the Zionist Jews and of the abortive Anglo-French démarches at Washington and New York; and knew that Mr. Woodrow Wilson, for good and sufficient reasons, always attached the greatest possible importance to the advice of a very prominent Zionist (Mr. Justice Brandeis, of the U.S. Supreme Court); and was in close touch with Mr. Greenberg, Editor of the Jewish Chronicle (London); and knew that several important Zionist Jewish leaders had already gravitated to London from the Continent on the qui vive awaiting events; and appreciated and realised the depth and strength of Jewish national aspirations; spontaneously took the initiative, to convince first of all Sir Mark Sykes, Under Secretary to the War Cabinet, and afterwards Monsieur Georges Picot, of the French Embassy in London, and Monsieur Goût of the Quai d'Orsay (Eastern Section), that the best and perhaps the only way (which proved so to be) to induce the American President to come into the War was to secure the co-operation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilise the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo contract basis. Thus, as will be seen, the Zionists, having carried out their part, and greatly helped to bring America in, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was but the public confirmation of the necessarily secret "gentleman's" agreement of 1916 made with the previous knowledge, acquiescence and/or approval of the Arabs and of the British, American, French and other Allied Governments, and not merely a voluntary altruistic and romantic gesture on the part of Great Britain as certain people either through pardonable ignorance assume or unpardonable illwill would represent or rather misrepresent.

Sir Mark Sykes was Under-Secretary to the War Cabinet specially concerned with Near Eastern affairs, and, although at the time scarcely acquainted with the Zionist movement, and unaware of the existence of its leaders, he had the flair to respond to the arguments advanced by

Mr. Malcolm as to the strength and importance of this movement in Jewry, in spite of the fact that many wealthy and prominent international or semi-assimilated Jews in Europe and America were openly or tacitly opposed to it (Zionist movement), or timidly indifferent. MM. Picot and Gout were likewise receptive.

An interesting account of the negotiations carried on in London and Paris, and subsequent developments, has already appeared in the Jewish press and need not be repeated here in detail, except to recall that immediately after the "gentleman's" agreement between Sir Mark Sykes, authorised by the War Cabinet, and the Zionist leaders, cable facilities through the War-Office, the Foreign Office and British Embassies, Legations, etc., were given to the latter to communicate the glad tidings to their friends and organisations in America and elsewhere, and the change in official and public opinion as reflected in the American press in favour of joining the Allies in the War, was as gratifying as it was surprisingly rapid.

The Balfour Declaration, in the words of Professor H. M. V. Temperley,* was "a definite contract between the British Government and Jewry." The main consideration given by the Jewish people (represented at the time by the leaders of the Zionist Organisation) was their help in bringing President Wilson to the aid of the Allies. Moreover, officially interpreted at the time by Lord Robert Cecil as "Judea for the Jews" in the same sense as "Arabia for the Arabs," the Declaration sent a thrill throughout the world. The prior Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, according to which Northern Palestine was to be politically detached and included in Syria (French sphere), was subsequently, at the instance of the Zionist leaders, amended so that the Jewish National Home should comprise the whole of Palestine in accordance with the promise previously made to them for their services by the British, Allied and American Governments and to give full effect to the Balfour Declaration, the terms of which had been settled and known to all Allied and associated belligerents, including Arabs, before they were made public.

In Germany, the value of the bargain to the Allies, apparently, was duly and carefully noted. In his "Through Thirty Years" Mr. Wickham

* History of the Peace Conference in Paris, 1920, volume 6, page 173.

† Franco-British Convention, December 1920 (Cmd. 1195).

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Steed, in a chapter appreciative of the value of Zionist support in America and elsewhere to the Allied cause, says General Ludendorff is alleged to have said after the War, that: "The Balfour Declaration was the cleverest thing done by the Allies in the way of propaganda, and that he wished Germany had thought of it first."* As a matter of fact, this was said by Ludendorff to Sir Alfred Mond (afterwards Lord Melchett), soon after the War. The fact that it was Jewish help that brought U.S.A. into the War on the side of the Allies has rankled ever since in German—especially Nazi—minds, and has contributed in no small measure to the prominence which anti-Semitism occupies in the Nazi programme.

An outstanding consideration, though not forming part of the bargain, was the great potential value of Zionism in future as an instrument of British foreign policy. (In 1917 a Jewish Department was opened in the Ministry of Information and several Zionists were in its service.)

But Zionism in its second stage continued to be under the Foreign Office only till 1921, when the Cairo Conference, under Mr. Winston Churchill, transferred the care of Palestine to the Colonial Office, no doubt because that Office is the only Government Department with experience of controlling overseas Colonies and fostering their development. It is worth noting here that this is the concern of Great Britain only and the views, if any, of foreign countries in regard to such colonial development are of no great moment. The case of Palestine, however, differs entirely from that of any British Colony, or even of other British Mandated territories. Firstly, by its historical associations, Palestine is of interest to all foreign countries. Secondly, its growth is at all times of intense interest to the Jewish inhabitants of the countries of the world. To-day, in view of what is happening to Jews in Central and Eastern Europe, the speeding up of Palestinian development is of poignant necessity in almost all foreign countries, which the Foreign Office would obviously be better able to appreciate. Thirdly, the constitution of Palestine is *sui generis* in that Great Britain is the trustee appointed by the League of Nations to administer Palestine for the benefit, not only of the present population, but of the Jewish people as a whole, who are to "reconstitute their National Home."† There is no precedent in Colonial Office experience for the case of Palestine, and what happens in

* Volume 2, page 392.

† These are the actual words of the Mandate for Palestine—see App. II.

and about Palestine can, and does, have important repercussions in foreign countries, and it would, therefore, be a very useful step if the Foreign Office could be kept fully informed of such repercussions.

Moreover, the fact that the very existence of the future of Jewish Palestine depends, from the point of view of international law, on a Mandate of the League of Nations has powerfully contributed towards making the Jews everywhere into strong supporters of the League of Nations. In France, for instance, it is well known that the Jews are among the leaders of the pro-League policy. In other lands it is equally true, though less well known. For instance, the views of such a man as Dr. Einstein—a convinced Zionist believer in the League—count heavily in the land where he now dwells—the U.S.A.

The Mandates Commission of the League has taken its duties of supervising the administration of the mandated territories very seriously. The Minutes of the Mandates Commission relating to Palestine are printed almost in extenso in Zionist periodicals all over the world and carefully studied. The undecided British attitude recorded in these Minutes has had an unfortunate effect on Jewish minds, especially in America. Faith in British promises and in the value of the League has been shaken. The three massacres (1920, 1921, 1929) of Jews in Palestine under British protection have naturally given very severe shocks to Jewish opinion.

In 1916 and 1917 the Jewish people were led to expect British help in building up an autonomous Jewish Commonwealth.* This aspiration has been the lodestar of Jewry amidst the gloom of persecution. The Jewish problem, which was already serious in 1897 at the time of the founding of the Zionist Organisation by Theodor Herzl, has since become progressively acute and pressing. The recent letter of resignation of Mr. James G. McDonald from the post of High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) from Germany, throws some light on the tragic position of the Jews and urgently

8
* The *Manchester Guardian* may be quoted as typical of the interpretation placed on the Balfour Declaration. In a leading article of the 10th November, 1917, it wrote as follows: "What it means is that, assuming our military successes to be continued and the whole of Palestine brought securely under our control, then at the conclusion of peace our deliberate policy will be to encourage in every way in our power Jewish immigration, to give full security, and no doubt a large measure of local autonomy, to the Jewish immigrants, with a view to the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State." The views of the leaders of British public opinion were collected and published as a brochure prepared by the Ministry of Information under the title "Great Britain, Palestine and the Jews" in December, 1917.

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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES



To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I Certify That the annexed copy, or each of the specified number of annexed copies, of each document listed below is a true copy of a document in the official custody of the Archivist of the United States.

Department of State Decimal File, 1910-1929, file 861.00/5067.
Summary of Report No. 9 of July 16, 1919, from the Directorate of Intelligence (Home Office), Scotland House, S. W. 1, entitled "A Monthly Review of the Progress of Revolutionary Movements Abroad." This report was enclosed with despatch No. 1072, dated London, July 23, 1919, from John W. Davis, American Ambassador to Great Britain, to the Secretary of State in Washington.

This document is from the General Records of the Department of State.

In testimony whereof, I, WAYNE C. GROVER, Archivist of the United States, have hereunto caused the Seal of the National Archives to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Acting Chief Archivist, General Records Division of the National Archives, in the District of Columbia, this 19th day of April 1961.



Wayne C. Grover
Archivist of the United States
By L. Philip Bauer

GSA WASH DC 60-74

NAR-350 • AUGUST 1959
(Formerly GSA Form 86)

By Ronald L. Wise

Date March 13 1961



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Report No. 9.

(Home Office)

Scotland House, S.W.1.

16th July, 1919.

A MONTHLY REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS ABROAD

(Circulated by the Home Secretary)

FRANCE	Page 1	NORWAY	Page 14
BELGIUM	" 2	SWEDEN	" 15
SWITZERLAND	" 3	DENMARK	" 15
GERMANY	" 4	HOLLAND	" 16
ITALY	" 6	SPAIN	" 16
HUNGARY	" 7	PORTUGAL	" 17
AUSTRIA	" 8	EGYPT	" 17
ROUMANIA	" 9	INDIA	" 18
BULGARIA	" 9	PERSIA	" 19
MONTENEGRO	" 10	BRITISH CROWN COLONIES ..	" 19
GREECE	" 10	AUSTRALIA	" 20
TURKEY	" 10	SOUTH AFRICA	" 20
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA	" 10	CANADA	" 20
RUSSIA	" 11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ..	" 21
POLAND	" 12	SOUTH AMERICA	" 22
FINLAND	" 13	MEXICO	" 23
BALTIC PROVINCES ...	" 13	CHINA	" 23

S U M M A R Y

There is now definite evidence that Bolshevism is an international movement controlled by Jews; communications are passing between the leaders in America, France, Russia and England, with a view to concerted action. Buda Pesth is merely an outpost of the Russian Soviet Government.

In Russia itself Bolshevism is beginning to change its character, and, if Lenin's administration falls, fears are expressed that the power may pass into the hands of the anarchists, which will mean complete chaos. In Buda Pesth, it is believed, any announcement of allied intervention would be welcomed by more than nine-tenths of the population.

Labour unrest is general throughout the world, but it is becoming apparent that much of it is economic and is part of the process of re-adjustment after the sudden decline in the purchasing power of money. The extreme elements naturally take advantage of any unrest.

While affairs in Holland and Switzerland are more stable, the position in Scandinavia seems to be changing for the worse.

Italy is in the throes of an industrial crisis, which may have profound political consequences. The assistance given by the Italians to the Hungarian Communists may prove to be a dangerous double-edged weapon.

Communism is Jewish !

"He [T. E. Lawrence] . . . was . . . pro-Zionist."

Lewis Bernstein Namier, In the Margin of History (London, 1939), p. 281

"[T. E.] Lawrence . . . expressed himself on more than one occasion in favour of the Jewish National Home."

Zionist Review (London: Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland), March 9, 1939, p. 6

"[T. E.] Lawrence had formed a great admiration for Chaim Weizmann since they met in Palestine after the fall of Jerusalem [1917] . . ."

Anthony Nutting, Lawrence of Arabia (London, 1961), p. 187

". . . Colonel [T. E.] Lawrence and myself became close personal friends . . ."

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, in Jewish Frontier (New York), December 1942, p. 4

"... Sir Winston Churchill . . . has spoken more highly of [T. E.] Lawrence than of any other man of our generation."

Robert Graves, in The New Republic (Washington), March 21, 1955, p. 17

"Lawrence of Arabia was . . . a fascinating as well as an heroic figure . . ."

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise (New York), in Opinion: a Journal of Jewish Life and Letters (New York), June 1935, p. 18

"Lawrence of Arabia was one of the most fascinating figures of the first half of the 20th century."

Rabbi Dr. J. Litvin, in The Gates of Zion (London: Central Synagogue Council of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland), July 1957, p. 32

"I would like at this point to pay tribute to the services which T. E. Lawrence rendered our cause, and to add something regarding his remarkable personality. I had met Lawrence fleetingly in Egypt, with [General] Allenby, and later in Palestine. I was to meet with him quite often later, and he was an occasional visitor to our house in London. His relationship to the Zionist movement was a very positive one, in spite of the fact that he was strongly pro-Arab, and he has mistakenly been represented as anti-Zionist. . . . His opinions, especially regarding the affairs of the Near East, were really worth having."

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949), p. 236

Lawrence of Arabia was a Zionist !

"Speaking entirely as a non-Jew, I am decidedly in favour of Zionism."

Colonel T. E. Lawrence, quoted in The Jewish Guardian (London), November 28, 1919, p. 11

". . . Col. T. E. Lawrence . . . took part in the discussions, and approved the [Balfour] Declaration."

The New Palestine (Washington: Zionist Organization of America), vol. 34, no. 12 (March 3, 1944), p. 284

". . . Sir Mark Sykes . . . and Colonel T. E. Lawrence . . . were firm supporters of Zionism."

Blanche E. C. Dugdale, The Balfour Declaration (London: Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1940), p. 25

". . . Lawrence of Arabia was one of those who were ardently in favor of Palestine as a Jewish national home."

Prof. Carl J. Friedrich (Harvard University) in radio address over Columbia Broadcasting System network, June 2, 1946, quoted in Talks (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System), July 1946, pp. 24-25

"Colonel [T. E.] Lawrence . . . in 1917 accepted the idea of the [Jewish] National Home [in Palestine] . . ."

Richard H. S. Crossman, A Nation Reborn (New York, 1960), p. 60

". . . On December 11 [1917], [General] Allenby made his official entry into Jerusalem. It was a simple but impressive ceremony. . . . Among those who walked in the same procession of twenty officers only, was Colonel (then Major) T. E. Lawrence . . ."

Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Allenby (London, 1940), p. 230

". . . [T. E.] Lawrence . . . became an avowed Zionist . . ."

Anita Engle, The Nili Spies (London, 1959), p. 232

". . . Col. [T. E.] Lawrence . . . knew a great deal about the matter [the British promise of Palestine to the Zionists]."

Thomas Reid, M. P. (Member, Palestine Royal Commission, 1936-1937), in The Royal Central Asian Journal (London), April 1946, p. 176

WORLD JEWRY, March 1, 1935.

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Rt. Hon. LORD MELCHETT (see page 10).

Principal Contents:

BALFOUR DECLARATION: SECRET HISTORY	S. Landman,
SHIMSHUN THE SHAMMAS	Ben Mowshay
PROFESSOR YAHUDA AND THE "STUERMER"	
HELP! (Cartoon)	J. H. Amshewitz, R.B.A.
FROM A COMMUNAL DIARY	Wayfarer
CAUSERIE OF THE WEEK	Commentator

Special Articles—

Deputies' Finance Problems. London Maccabi Dinner.
Palestine and Imperial Preference

BALFOUR DECLARATION:

Secret Facts Revealed

Important and hitherto unpublished sidelights on the Balfour Declaration are for the first time revealed in the series of articles by Mr. S. Landman, the first of which appears below. From 1915 until 1918 Mr. Landman acted as private secretary to Mr. N. Sokolow, now President of the Zionist Organisation. He was also secretary of the World Zionist Organisation from the opening of the London Office at the end of 1917 until 1922.

Everyone is acquainted with Dr. Weizmann's work during the first two years of the War, but not everyone knows exactly what took place during the crucial summer of 1916. At that time, Sokolow and Tehlenow, members of the Executive of the Zionist organisation, were already in London, whither they had come at the suggestion of Dr. Weizmann, who from the first days of the war had believed with perfect faith in an Allied victory, and in the certainty of Palestine coming into the sphere of influence of the Allies. So great, however, was the absorption of the Cabinet in the life and death struggle, that two years of intense propaganda had, as yet, made no noticeable impression.

Secret Proposal to Divide Palestine.

In fact, the British and French Governments had entered into a secret pact, known as the Sykes-Picot Treaty, from the names of the representatives of the parties,—Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot,—for the purpose of dividing Palestine, giving the Northern half to France and the Southern to England. **In this pact there is no suggestion of any Jewish interest in Palestine.**

That was the situation in the late summer of 1916, when Sir Mark Sykes, then Under-Secretary of the War Cabinet (with Amery and Ormsby-Gore), held a conversation with Mr. James Malcolm, a member of the Armenian National Delegation who was of such invaluable help to the British Government in Eastern affairs.

Sir Mark told Malcolm that the War Cabinet was greatly disturbed at the failure, up to that time, of all efforts to enlist the practical sympathy and help of the United States. The French Government had sent a special Emissary, without success. Italy had tried to use the influence of powerful Italian citizens in the U.S.A., but to no avail. He had thought of enlisting the substantial Jewish influence in the United States, but had been unable to do so.

The leaders of Anglo-Jewry, lay and clerical, whom he had seen, did not seem able to give him effective help. It might be that the Jewish hatred of Tsarist Russia was so strong as to make it impossible for American Jews to be other than pro-German.

Malcolm informed Sykes that there was a way to make American Jews thoroughly pro-Ally, and he knew of a man in America who was probably the most intimate friend of President Wilson. Through that man, if through anybody, the President's mind could be turned towards active participation in the War on the side of the Allies.

Zionist Movement as the Key.

Malcolm said further, "You are going the wrong way about it. The well-to-do English Jews you meet, and the Jewish clergy, are not the real leaders of the Jewish people. You have forgotten the existence of the principle of nationality. . . . Do you know of the Zionist Movement?"

Sir Mark Sykes admitted comparative ignorance of Zionism, and Malcolm continued, "You can win the sympathy of Jews, everywhere, in one way only, and that way is by offering to try and secure Palestine for them. . . ."

Sir Mark, thinking of the Sykes-Picot treaty, said that such a move was impossible. Malcolm insisted that there was no other way, and urged a Cabinet discussion. A day or two later Sykes told him that the matter had been mentioned to Lord Milner (at that time a very influential member of the War Cabinet) who had asked

for further information. Malcolm pointed out the influence of Judge Brandeis of the American Supreme Court, and his strong Zionist sympathies. If Sir Mark Sykes could obtain from the War Cabinet an assurance that help would be given towards securing Palestine for the Jews, it was certain that Jews in all neutral countries, especially the United States, would become pro-British, and pro-Ally.

The Cabinet could not give any definite promise, but advised Malcolm to open negotiations with the Zionist leaders. This, Malcolm said, was impossible, as he could not go to them empty handed. It would be sufficient if Malcolm were convinced of the sincerity of the Cabinet's intentions, so that he could go to the Zionists and say, "If you help the Allies, you will have the support of the British in securing Palestine for the Jews."

This appealed to Sir Mark, but he saw grave difficulties. In the first place, France was counting on the Sykes-Picot Treaty. France would have to be persuaded to support the idea of Palestine for the Jews. Then there was the Vatican (Sir Mark himself was a Catholic), which would not support a scheme which meant placing the Christian Holy Places under Jewish control.

Malcolm replied that these difficulties must be overcome if the Allies wanted the help of the United States. Palestine meant Jewish support, which was becoming increasingly necessary.

Apparent Apathy Amongst Jews.

Sir Mark Sykes raised the objection of the apparent apathy of the bulk of Jews to the Palestine idea. Malcolm replied, "That is because you have not met the other kind of Jews, who are remarkable types, and intensely attached to the idea of the National Home. There are tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of such Jews. The wealthy Jewish bankers of London are completely out of touch with them." Sir Mark undertook to report the conversation to the Cabinet. He said he felt rather hopeful, because the Cabinet (Milner, Grey, and Balfour), were already convinced that the idea of Palestine for the Jews was just and right.

A day or two later, Malcolm was informed that the Cabinet had agreed to his suggestions, and authorised him to open negotiations with the Zionists. Malcolm thereupon wrote a letter to L. J. Greenberg of the "Jewish Chronicle," saying that the time had come for Jewry to cease to be anti-Russian and pro-German, and to come definitely on the side of the Allies. If this could be done, there was a great opportunity for the Jews to secure Palestine.

Greenberg replied enthusiastically, inviting Malcolm to a discussion. At this discussion, Greenberg offered to arrange a meeting between Sir Mark Sykes and the Zionist leaders, Sokolow, Tehlenow, and Dr. Weizmann, but first of all, Malcolm himself should meet them. Malcolm went with Greenberg to Sir Mark Sykes, and later, Greenberg arranged for Malcolm to meet Dr. Weizmann at his house in Addison Road. In this way were the Zionist leaders first brought into contact with the British War Cabinet.

(To be continued).


In the little Republic of Costa Rica, there are about 350 Jews, who have provided work for more than a thousand employees, mainly Costa Ricans. In return for this, the local merchants and landowners have raised the cries of "Communists" and "Protocols"

Secret History of the Balfour Declaration

(Continued from last week)

By S. LANDMAN

IT was about the end of 1916 that James Malcolm, through Leopold Greenberg, first came into contact with Dr. Weizmann. This memorable interview took place at Dr. Weizmann's house in Addison Road. Dr. Weizmann had moved from Manchester to London in that year and was working on explosives for



The late Lord Balfour

the Admiralty and the Ministry of Munitions. As is well known he had invented an important process for the manufacture of acetone and this had brought him into contact with Lloyd George, the Minister of Munitions, and Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty. In this talk with Malcolm Dr. Weizmann confessed his disappointment that his efforts to win over Lloyd George and Balfour to the Zionist cause had apparently made no progress, and he asked Malcolm what reason he (Malcolm) had for being convinced of success. Malcolm reported to him the conversations he had had with Sir Mark Sykes, and the War Cabinet's authority for his (Malcolm's) overtures to the Zionists. Dr. Weizmann's doubts were still strong and he asked when he could see Sir Mark Sykes. "At once, I believe," replied Malcolm, and he rang up Sir Mark, informed him that he was speaking from Dr. Weizmann's house, and asked for an appointment to bring Dr. Weizmann to him. Sir Mark fixed one for the next day but Dr. Weizmann was prevented from going and Sokolow went instead. The interview was very successful, both parties making the best impression on each other. Further interviews took place, at which Dr. Weizmann was also present. Of course, all these interviews took place with the full knowledge and approval of Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

Mr. G. H. Fitzmaurice

There was another man—an Irishman—who rendered most valuable service at this time to the bringing together of the Zionists and the British Government. This was Mr. G. H. Fitzmaurice, a great friend of Malcolm. Fitzmaurice had spent many years in the British Embassy in Constantinople, and was very well versed in all the problems of the Near East. Malcolm had, at a very early stage, discussed with him the possibilities of effecting a rapprochement between the Jews, especially in the U.S.A. and other neutral countries, and the British and Allied cause. Fitzmaurice was finally won over and became a very devoted friend of Zionism. I first made his acquaintance about the middle of 1917, and I can say with confidence that he was one of the earliest and most discerning of our friends. I remember him saying to me in 1918: "A nation which has a Rothschild and an Einstein must win through . . ." He was, like Sykes, a devout Catholic, and amongst his intimate friends were Sir Henry Wilson and General Macdonogh, Director of Military Operations, whom he won over to the Jewish cause. It was Fitzmaurice chiefly who helped to open for Sokolow the doors of the Vatican, with the result that the Pope granted Sokolow an audience in 1917 and thereby indicated that the Vatican was favourably disposed to the idea of Palestine for the Jews. It

previously held the view that there was no way of winning the sympathy of the Vatican or of such men as Sir Mark Sykes, because they were Catholics. It is the great achievement of Malcolm that he was not only able to convince them of the justice of the Zionist cause, but even to enlist their active support.

After an understanding had been arrived at between Sir Mark Sykes and Weizmann and Sokolow, it was resolved to send a secret message to Justice Brandeis that the British Cabinet would help the Jews to gain Palestine in return for active Jewish sympathy and support in U.S.A. for the allied cause so as to bring about a radical pro-Ally tendency in the United States. This message was sent in cipher through the Foreign Office. One of the principal under-secretaries at the Foreign Office at that time was Sir Ronald Graham. He was in the confidence of Sir Mark Sykes and during the whole time he was at the Foreign Office he was of unfailing help to the Zionists. Secret messages were also sent to the Zionist leaders in Russia to hearten them and obtain their support for the allied cause, which was being affected by Russian ill-treatment of the Jews. Messages were also sent to Jewish leaders in neutral countries and the result was to strengthen the pro-Ally sympathies of Jews everywhere.

Through General Macdonogh, who was won over by Fitzmaurice, Dr. Weizmann was able, about this time, to secure from the Government the service of half a dozen younger Zionists for active work on behalf of Zionism. At that time conscription was in force and only those who were engaged in work of national importance could be released from active service at the front. I remember Dr. Weizmann writing a letter to General Macdonogh and invoking his assistance in obtaining the exemption from active service of Leon Simon, Harry Sacher, Simon Marks, Hyamson Tokowsky, and myself. At Dr. Weizmann's request I was transferred from the War Office (M.I.9) where I was then working, to the Ministry of Propaganda, which was under Lord Northcliffe, and later to the Zionist Office where I commenced work about December, 1916. Simon Marks actually arrived at the office in khaki and immediately set about the task of organising the office, which, as will be easily understood, had to maintain constant communication with Zionists in most countries.

Government Help

From that time onwards for several years Zionism was considered an ally of the British Government, and every help and assistance was forthcoming from each government department. Passport or travel difficulties did not exist when a man was recommended by our office. For instance, a certificate signed by me was accepted by the Home Office at that time as evidence that an Ottoman Jew was to be treated as a friendly alien and not as an enemy, which was the case with the Turkish subjects.

After Sir Mark Sykes had established contact with the Zionist leaders, it was resolved to have a more formal meeting so that one of the Zionist leaders could be officially appointed to act on behalf of the Zionist movement. This meeting took place on February 7, 1917, at the house of Dr. Gaster, who had already been in touch with Sir Mark and Sir Herbert Samuel, with reference to Zionism. Sir Herbert Samuel, James de Rothschild, Sokolow, Tchenow, and Dr. Weizmann were the principal Zionists who attended there to meet Sir Mark Sykes. The result of the meeting was that Sokolow was chosen to act as Zionist representative, and

Secret History of the Balfour Declaration

(Continued from Page 6)

to negotiate with Sir Mark. Dr. Weizmann was, at that time, too fully occupied with his chemical work for the Government.

Sokolow in Paris

The plan of action decided upon by Sir Mark Sykes and Sokolow was for Sokolow to go to France and Italy and make sure there was no opposition. In the meantime Dr. Weizmann would continue to win friends in England. In connection with the visit of Sokolow to Paris, Malcolm again rendered immense service to the Zionist cause. As a member of the Armenian National Delegation, he was personally acquainted with the leading French officials in charge of Near Eastern affairs—especially M. Gout, M. Picot and M. de Margerie. They were the three key men for the Zionist purpose. Malcolm went first alone to M. Picot and prepared the way for Sokolow. Sokolow had previously tried to invoke the assistance of French Jewry in getting an audience from the French Government. He had not been successful. The "Alliance Israelite" used every effort to dissuade him from talking Zionism to the Ministers. Even Baron Edmond de Rothschild, the devoted friend of Palestine and the Zionist leaders, could not very well ask the French Government to depart in favour of England from its traditional role of protector of the peoples of the Near East. The position was such that Sokolow doubted very much whether he would be given an audience at the Quai d'Orsay. With the help of Malcolm, however, all the difficulties were overcome and the leaders of French Jewry, to their intense amazement and annoyance, read in the "Temps" that M. Sokolow had been received by M. Pichon, the Foreign Minister. Not only that, but they found M. Sokolow had actually been invited to stay to lunch. M. Jacques Bigart and M. Sylvain Levi, both of the "Alliance Israelite," telephoned to M. Sokolow's hotel to make sure they had heard aright, and finished up by inviting Sokolow themselves.

I have from Malcolm an interesting story of Sokolow's first interview with M. Picot. The latter was, of course, sizing up the man with whom he had to deal, and at the very end, when helping M. Sokolow on with his coat, he said as though it was of minor importance: "By the way, M. Sokolow, may I ask you one more question? Which Government would the Jews prefer to have in Palestine, the English or the French?" Sokolow was, however, quite ready with a reply, "You embarrass me, M. Picot," he answered. "I feel rather like the child who is asked whom do you love more, your mother or your father!"

M. Picot was delighted with this reply, which seemed to him worthy of the best French diplomacy.

From Paris, Sokolow left for Rome. There, thanks to the introductions of Fitzmaurice and Malcolm on the one hand and the help of Baron Sidney Sonnino on the other, everything was prepared for him. The audience with the Pope was quickly arranged and also interviews with the leading officials of the Foreign Office. The return to London of Sokolow found Dr. Weizmann and his small band of helpers in the throes of a mighty struggle with Anglo-Jewish leaders. Just as the leading French Jews tried hard to keep Zionism away from their Government, so did the leading Anglo-Jews do their utmost to keep Zionism away from the British Government. Edwin Montagu was a leading opponent and remained such all his life. Lord Swaythling (the son of the first Lord Swaythling) was equally vehement in his opposition.

Eleven of them joined forces in a letter to "The Times" about May, 1917, protesting against Zionist aims and objects. Sir Mark Sykes informed us that something must be done to impress the Cabinet, and the Zionist leaders were compelled to take up the challenge. It was absolutely essential to convince the Cabinet that Anglo-Jewry was Zionist in sympathy and outlook, in view of the constant denial of this, which they heard from the leading Jews.

A rapid campaign among the members of the Jewish Board of Deputies was organised, and when it was seen that a majority was obtainable, a pro-Zionist resolution was introduced and carried by a majority against the wishes and speeches of the President David Alexander, K.C., and other honorary officers. The President and Mr. Henriques resigned, thus leaving the field clear for the Zionists.

The Declaration

In the meantime, the text of the Declaration was being prepared. The text submitted by the Zionists was, of course, more far-reaching than the final text. On the other hand, Lucien Wolf had some time before suggested to the Zionists a text which was pale and colourless. I cannot recollect the exact words, but it was to the effect that if Palestine came under the British sphere of influence, Jews should be given no less right to colonise it than anybody else. If this text had been acceptable it could have gone forward in the name of Anglo-Jewry. Naturally the Zionist leaders could not accept it, and nothing more was heard of it. Mr. Ormsby-Gore was of great assistance throughout this stage as a link with Mr. Balfour. It is correct to say that the text of the Declaration had to satisfy many conflicting claims. The Anglo-Jewish leaders were apprehensive lest a Jewish Palestine should affect their civic rights here, and all were also genuinely concerned for the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.

The opposition of Anglo-Jewry was still considerable, and the Cabinet could not see a way through the impasse. It was eventually decided to send the Draft of the Declaration to several leading Jews and obtain their opinions.

Through the help of Sir Mark Sykes, three of these letters were sent to Zionists or Zionist sympathisers. Three were sent to anti-Zionists. There were thus three against three and everything depended on the seventh or decisive letter. This was to Dr. Hertz, and his reply was emphatic and favourable.

This brought us to the autumn of 1917 when all was ready for the issue of the Declaration. But the Cabinet was too preoccupied with the anxieties of the Great War, which was absorbing every ounce of their strength and every moment of their time.

Meeting after meeting passed and the item of Palestine on the Agenda of the Cabinet was not reached.

Finally, at the beginning of November, Sir Mark Sykes came out of the Cabinet room very excited; exclaiming: "It's a boy." Thus was born the famous Balfour Declaration, the greatest event in Jewish history for centuries.

At a meeting of Zionists held immediately afterwards, Sokolow said they must celebrate this Declaration with such solemnity that it would be impossible to forget it. The text was cabled through the War Office and Foreign Office to the Jews in the remotest corners of the earth. Sheafs of cables were taken by us to the War Office for this purpose.

Many heads, hearts and hands combined to bring the Balfour Declaration into existence. The share of the British Cabinet and the Zionist leaders is already well known. It is only just that the efforts of other non-Jewish friends such as Malcolm and Fitzmaurice should be known and appreciated.

JAN. 8 1962

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THE NEXT WAR

a series edited by
CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART

Propaganda

in the next war

by

SIDNEY ROGERSON

GEOFFREY BLES

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1938

PROPAGANDA IN THE NEXT WAR

of all dictator countries, and backed by the influence of the Catholic Church and undenominational liberals. At the moment we have a strong section of American opinion against us, but if war were to break out to-morrow between England and Germany this mass of opinion would have to come down on one side or the other and it will be marvellous indeed if German propaganda could succeed in bringing it down on theirs. In general the situation in the United States is more favourable to Great Britain than in 1914, in that the obvious centres of infection have been removed: but less favourable in that we have temporarily at any rate lost caste as a "democratic" State because of the propaganda which represents us as truckling to or at least having truck with "dictators." Though we are not unfavourably placed, we shall require to do much propaganda to keep the United States benevolently neutral.

To persuade her to take our part will be much more difficult, so difficult as to be unlikely to succeed. It will need a definite threat to America; a threat, moreover, which will have to be brought home by propaganda to every citizen, before the republic will again take arms in an external quarrel. The position will naturally be considerably eased if Japan were involved and this might and probably would bring America in without further ado. At any rate, it would be a natural and obvious object of our propagandists to achieve this, just as during the Great War they succeeded in embroiling the United States with Germany.

Fortunately with America our propaganda is on firm ground. We can be entirely sincere, as our main plank will be the old democratic one. We

PARTITION of PALESTINE

**SUGGESTED ALTERATIONS
in
PROPOSED FRONTIERS**

by

JAMES A. MALCOLM



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PARTITION of PALESTINE

SUGGESTED ALTERATIONS IN PROPOSED FRONTIERS

CHOUGH often leisurely and sometimes even tardily, yet with unerring instinct, England has always sensed when "the moment of peril is also that of courage." So now, she has recognised that the ideals of British fairplay no longer serve as an antidote for Power Politics, whether in the Farthest or in the Nearest East.

As an earnest of this, to the dismay and disappointment of ungrateful and treacherous "friends," she has taken appropriate measures for the restoration of law and order in Palestine—presumably as a preliminary to implementing, so far as may be "equitable and practicable," the recommendations of the Royal Commission.

Nevertheless there must necessarily still be much active thinking and thoughtful action before effect can be given to any scheme of Partition.

Therefore, as it was my privilege, in association with the late Sir Mark Sykes, at that time under-Secretary to the War Cabinet, to play an obscure part in the earliest negotiations (autumn of 1916) which culminated in the Balfour Declaration, perhaps I may now presume without further apologia, to offer some suggestions for the eventual success and security of the contemplated Jewish State in the Holy Land.

The Jewish question, which, for at least 1,700 years, has progressively affected more or less almost every country in the world, was paradoxically so little understood at the time that, when the Balfour Declaration, as a quid pro quo for Zionist or Nationalist and not (as some erroneously suppose) for international Jewish services in the Great War, was made on November 2nd 1917 on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers and Belligerents (the Arabs included), the vast majority of the civilised world wondered what it was all about. But a small minority had the confidence ~~and the vision to look upon it as the hopeful and auspicious be~~ginning of a just and satisfactory solution of an age-old and baffling

THE PALESTINE PROPOSALS

BROADCAST DISCUSSION

The Government's Palestine policy was the subject of a discussion broadcast in the National programme last night in which members of the Government and representatives of the Opposition parties took part.

Mr. MALCOLM MACDONALD, Secretary of State for the Colonies, said the condemnation by both sides was perhaps the best evidence that the policy held evenly between the Jewish and the Arab claims. If the present state of uncertainty about the future were allowed to continue, it would not only create a permanent hatred between the Arabs and the Jews but it would open up a sore in the Middle East which might never be healed.

It had been suggested in some quarters that the Government's policy would inaugurate a régime of domination of Jew by Arab, but that was not so, and the Government had deliberately set their face against it. During the transition period which must precede the creation of the independent State—that period would last for the next 10 years or so—there were various safeguards for the Jews. Principal among them was that in all matters of importance the British High Commissioner would have the last word. He could overrule his advisers and he would govern Palestine. When an independent State was created the Government was determined that there should be no room for one community to dominate the other.

"UNWISE AND DANGEROUS"

Mr. TOM WILLIAMS, Labour M.P. for Don Valley, said the great aim to provide the Jews with a home where they would be free of minority life was to be denied them even in Palestine. They were to suffer there the same hardships and anxieties to which they were subjected on the Continent of Europe. The White Paper was narrow, unwise, and dangerous; it could serve only to perpetuate conflict by giving way to terrorism and aggression.

"A DEFINITE BARGAIN"

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said the Balfour Declaration about the establishment of a homeland for the Jews in the land of Canaan was not offered out of our abundant grace. It was a definite bargain in return for a valuable consideration—the effective support of the Jews to the Allied cause, notably in America, Russia, and Central Europe. Every pledge given to the Arabs had been more than fulfilled. Every undertaking given to the Jews had been reluctantly and inadequately implemented, and now it was to be gradually attenuated to the point of elimination.

A hopeful and successful experiment was being arrested. The mischievous activities fostered by the Italians and the Germans in recent years among a small section of the Arabs had driven us into an act of national perfidy which would bring dishonour to the British name. It had antagonized the powerful communities of Jews numbering 17,000,000 residing in every quarter of the globe. It would strengthen a deepening and a disastrous conviction that our word of honour could no longer be relied upon if good faith cost us anything.

ARAB RIGHTS

PALESTINE.

ITS PROBLEMS & FUTURE.

II.—THE MANDATE.

By SIR MARTIN CONWAY, M.P.

The natural man hankers after mystery. The more publicity envelops affairs the more curious does he become about what happens behind the scenes. However the so-called new diplomacy may affect perfect candour, the public suspects the action of unrevealed powers and seeks for traces of the hidden hand. In this the public instinct is, of course, a true one. The forces that ultimately appear, operating openly in the light of day, are of obscure origin and slow growth; they are also the resultant of many smaller forces, pulling this way and that, whose action the wisest cannot follow, far less control. If this is true in local and national affairs, if obscurity veils the formation and growth of public opinion in a city, a class, or a nation, an even denser fog blinds the observer of things international. It is only of late years that the value of international propaganda has been practically understood and efforts made to profit by it. During the war vast sums of money were spent by the several belligerents to set forth the merits of their case in foreign countries, both neutral and Allied, and thus to gain the support arising from their sympathy.

Those concerned with propaganda of necessity had to pay much attention to existing international organisations, which are forces of great efficiency. Such, for instance, are the Roman Catholic Church, the Jews, and other like international powers. The Roman Church, as represented by the Vatican, could not be looked upon as helpful to the Allies. Its Irish membership was divided and, on the whole, more hostile than friendly to them. The traditional hostility to Protestant England, "infidel" France, and the anti-Papal Government of Italy, tended in the same direction. Help was not to be looked for from that quarter. The Jewish community was not thus definitely pledged. England had for long been their best friend, and it was evidently a matter of great moment to strengthen that good understanding. The importance of so doing was overwhelmingly evident to all who were engaged in propaganda in the United States before that great country came into the war.

Broadly speaking, Americans of English descent were from the outset on the side of the Allies, but they only form a minority of the population. A large proportion of the Irish, a very influential factor on the other side of the Atlantic, were, at least, indifferent, if not definitely hostile to the cause of the Allies. The

people of German descent included a vast number of Jews, and it was a matter of supreme importance to win Jewish sympathy and support. The Press of the United States is largely controlled by Jews. Their power in finance is well known. Their international relations are understood to be elaborate and efficiently maintained. They were capable of heavily damaging the Allies by adverse propaganda; their financial opposition might almost have been fatal to us. If the American Jews had been strongly and persistently hostile to our cause, it is probable that the United States could not have been brought into the war. It was under these circumstances that the negotiations were set on foot which resulted in the Balfour Declaration, an act characterised by the indubitably highest and most capable German authority as the cleverest thing done by Great Britain during the whole course of hostilities.

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION.

The general public does not realise that the idea of the Balfour Declaration was of slow growth, and that it only took form after long and minute discussion. To recapitulate the negotiations here would be wearisome, and is not necessary. The leaders of the Zionist movement were introduced to Mr. Lloyd George in 1914, and from that time onward discussions continued. Schemes were put forward, modified, developed. Various versions of the ultimate formula were suggested, criticised, rejected, replaced, till finally one was agreed on, and was put into the mouth of Mr. Balfour, who gave official utterance to it on behalf of the British Government on Nov. 2, 1917. It ran as follows:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.

No act of State could have been more formal. The honour of the British Government and people was pledged, and so remains, and must remain. The suggestion that such a pledge can be lightly set aside and disregarded can only come from light-minded journalists and irresponsible talkers. The pledge was accepted; the goods were delivered. The Jewish community all over the world backed the Allies. America came into the war. In the words of "The Case against Zionism,"

During the world war it (the pledge) insured for the Allies the loyalty and financial support of the Jews all over the world, and assured England of a permanent suzerainty over the Southern portion of Syria for the protection of the Suez Canal, which is the spinal cord of England's colonistic Empire.

Great Britain, therefore, can by no possibility go back on the Balfour Declaration. Whatever the future relations of Britain to Palestine may be, the Declaration must remain one of the pivots of our Imperial policy. What we have promised we must perform. There were, however, other promises made, and these also have to be kept.

A MATTER OF HIGH POLICY.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES




To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I Certify That the annexed copy, or each of the specified number of annexed copies, of each document listed below is a true copy of a document in the official custody of the Archivist of the United States.

Department of State Decimal File, 1910-1929. File 763.72119.
Letter of March 11, 1918, from William Yale, Special Agent
of the Department of State, to Leland Harrison, and pages
one and six of the enclosed report numbered 18.

This document is from the General Records of the Department
of State.

In testimony whereof, I, WAYNE C. GROVER, Archivist of the United States,
have hereunto caused the Seal of the National
Archives to be affixed and my name subscribed
by the Acting Chief Archivist, General Records
Division of the National Archives,
in the District of Columbia, this 30th day
of March 1961.


Wayne C. Grover
Archivist of the United States
By Philip Bauer

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AGENCY

CAIRO

March 11th. 1918.

Mr Leland Harrison
Department of State
Washington D.C.



Y. 23.

Sir:-

I herewith enclose Report #18 and a confirmation copy of Report #17.

Certain phases of the present situation here, which have been deal with in Reports #17 and #18, appear to me to be worthy of your immediate notice, because of their possible bearing on the future. In these reports I have expressed my opinions and drawn certain conclusions because I felt compelled to do so because of what seems to my judgement the seriousness of the present complications. I sincerely trust that you will understand that I am in no way trying to force my opinions, and that it has simply been my aim to draw attention to the possible danger in the present condition of affairs.


I have the honor

to be, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant.

William Gutz

*See / 1740 for original
Report #17 - Copy bound
herewith*



FILED
AUG 11 1919

REPORT #18.

March 11th. 1918.

Discontent among the Arabs.

The past two weeks have been spent in collecting information from every available source concerning the Arab situation, and Report #17 represents data obtained from French, British and Arab sources, while the opinions expressed represent the conclusions drawn by the writer on the information he was able to secure.

Since Report #17 was written the writer has had an interview with a certain Major Lawrence of the British Army, which throws another light on the Arab situation. The statements of Major Lawrence are given in this report.

Major Lawrence's opinions demand the most serious consideration because of his intimate knowledge of the Arabs and the importance of the work he is engaged in.

Previous to the war Major Lawrence, who is a young archeologist, spent a long time travelling in Syria and the year previous to the war he was attached to the Palestine Exploration Fund Expedition, which was completing a survey of southern Palestine commenced many years before by the late Lord Kitchner. The writer of this report first made the acquaintance of Major Lawrence at Bir-es-Saba in January 1914 where he was engaged in the survey of southern Palestine.

During the past eighteen months Major Lawrence has been occupied with the Arabs and has spent a goodly part of the time among the Arab tribes. More recently he has been among



by recent events and are confused by the policy of the British towards the Zionists and by the present activities permitted the Zionists.

Major Lawrence evidently fears the effect upon the Arabs of the present attitude of the Allies towards the Zionists, he characterizes it as a dangerous policy, and speaks of the activities permitted the Zionist in Egypt and in Palestine as being unwise and foolhardy. He continued to say " I suppose that we are supporting the Zionists for the help it was thought that they could be to us in Russia and because they brought America into the war"

He declares that the Arabs have great faith in the United States, and that they believe in America's political honesty. He believes that later, if things should not turn out as well as is expected and if there should be an eminent danger of the disaffection of the Arabs, a declaration by the United States concerning the future of the Arabs and their country would prove to be a "trump card" to play against the Turko-German propaganda, and he feels that such a declaration would have an enormous effect upon the Arabs.

Major Lawrence does not fear any immediate danger of a serious disaffection of the Arabs, but is counting very much on the success of military operations in the near future to obviate any danger. However he implied that a reverse in military matters might render the situation critical and threaten the Arab Movement. The effect of the Zionist Movement upon the Arabs is feared by Major

Lawrence

MR. JAMES A. MALCOLM

Captain E. J. C. Chapman writes:—

I feel it is fitting that a tribute should be paid to the work of Mr. Malcolm on behalf of ex-service men. He was the co-founder in 1907 of the Veterans Club at Hand Court, High Holborn, for ex-service men. The club has continued its existence under the title of the Allenby Services Club and later under its present title of the Victory Ex-Services Club, which is now at 73-79, Seymour Street, Marble Arch. Mr. Malcolm was the honorary treasurer of the club and worked very hard to promote its success. He saw it grow and reach a record membership figure of over 18,637 in 1952. He was also a co-founder of the United Services Corps, which provides employment for ex-service men in the capacity of commissionaires, &c. He retained his enthusiasm for these activities right up to the time of his recent death at the age of 85. All ex-service men have lost a great friend in his passing.

A Zionist correspondent writes:—

News of the passing of James A. Malcolm has aroused keen regret among Jews and Zionists in many countries. His name has already a secure niche in Jewish history. According to Dr. Weizmann, President of Israel, it was James Malcolm's useful and timely initiative in 1916 which brought together the War Cabinet and the Zionist leaders. Out of this contact there eventually emerged an agreement whereby the Zionists helped to gain the good will of United States Jewry and in particular help in gaining the United States as an ally: in return the restoration of Palestine to the Jews was to be declared a war aim.

James Malcolm retained his great interest and faith in Zionism throughout his long life and frequently wrote to the Press in its defence. His efforts to bring about better relations between Jews and Arabs are well remembered and he was loved and respected by all who met him.

THE Forrestal DIARIES

Edited by Walter Millis

WITH THE COLLABORATION OF
E. S. DUFFIELD



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FORETASTE OF THE COLD WAR

121

22 December 1945

Unification

Senator McFarland [Ernest W. McFarland, Democrat, of Arizona] called on me this morning to express the hope that the Navy was not too downhearted about the President's message. He said that there were still many people in the Senate, including himself, who had grave doubts as to the wisdom of consolidation, particularly on the loss of morale involved in such a step.

I told him the greatest help he could be to us would be to assist Senator Walsh in his efforts to insure that the bill was referred to the Naval Affairs Committee for consideration as well as the Military Affairs Committee. He said he had already talked to Senator Walsh on this and would continue to be of as much help as possible.

I told the Senator that we proposed to continue the preparation of our case for presentation to Senator Walsh's committee and that it would be a most careful and exhaustive examination of all the factors involved in the Army's proposal. I told him we would assign an officer to keep him advised of the development of the case as it went along and to facilitate his own study on the matter.

[The battle was to be fought before Congress and the public through the next eighteen months. At the moment Forrestal had time for a note on past history.]

27 December 1945

Played golf today with Joe Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, who was Roosevelt's Ambassador to Great Britain in the years immediately before the war]. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's [William C. Bullitt, then Ambassador to France] urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that

122

THE Forrestal DIARIES

the Germans must be faced down about Poland, neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn't fight, Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversation with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside. Kennedy's response always was that putting iron up his backside did no good unless the British had some iron with which to fight, and they did not.

What Kennedy told me in this conversation jibes substantially with the remarks Clarence Dillon had made to me already, to the general effect that Roosevelt had asked him in some manner to communicate privately with the British to the end that Chamberlain should have greater firmness in his dealings with Germany. Dillon told me that at Roosevelt's request he had talked with Lord Lothian in the same general sense as Kennedy reported Roosevelt having urged him to do with Chamberlain. Lothian presumably was to communicate to Chamberlain the gist of his conversation with Dillon.

Looking backward there is undoubtedly foundation for Kennedy's belief that Hitler's attack could have been deflected to Russia, but I think he fails to take into account what would have happened after Hitler had conquered Russia. Would he have been content to stop? Nothing in his record indicates that that would have been the case, but rather that having removed the threat to his eastern frontiers he would then have exercised the options open to him to construct a European German-dominated system to which he later gave expression after overrunning France.

Kennedy said that the Russian demand for incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the U.S.S.R. was the stumbling block, in the spring of 1939, to an understanding between Russia and England. The fundamental difficulty of England, however, was that if they backed Germany . . . they